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WHEN A GROUP of businessmen in New York asked Prime Minister Nehru 
about the Indian Government’s policy towards foreign investment, he is reported to 
have looked out of the window and commented on the weather. Nehru's lofty disdain 
for foreign direct investment (FDI) was not born out of a lack of faith in its potential 
to transfer technology and know-how, but of his resolve to shield the economy from 
the grip of foreign interests; indeed, science and technology formed the centrepiece of 
the prime minister’s development strategy for India.. The sizeable presence of British 
capital in pre-independence India had done little to promote development, its large 
presence in extractive industries, plantations, shipping, banking and insurance were 
geared to promoting colonial interests. Nehru’s ideals of democratic socialism and 
economic self-sufficiency were shaped by his aversion to India’s colonial past and 
dependence on Britain. 
The highly regulated foreign trade and investment regimes in place until 
recently formed an integral part of this design of self-sufficiency.  Even so, foreign 
enterprise participation in the economy was not shunned, its spheres of activity and 
the form it took were highly regulated. Foreign capital was barred from specified 
industries and technical collaboration agreements or technology licensing agreements 
between Indian owned and foreign firms were preferred to FDI. And the policy 
framework was opaque with implementation of policy based on bureaucratic 
consideration of each case on its merits.  
The 1991 economic reforms were to change all this. Along with the virtual 
abolition of the industrial licensing system, controls over foreign trade and foreign 
investment were considerably relaxed, including the removal of ceilings on equity 
ownership by foreign firms. The reforms did result in increased inflows of FDI during 
the decade of the nineties. Even so, the volume of FDI in India is relatively low 
compared with that in the East Asian countries and China. This relatively low volume 
of FDI, especially so in comparison with China, has attracted widespread comment 
and sweeping policy recommendations for increasing the volume of FDI in the 
country. Most recently, a veritable David in the form of Jeffrey Sachs (and his 
associates from Harvard University) has appeared on the scene, with policy  
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recommendations on how to slay the Goliath of Indian bureaucracy and other 
impediments to FDI.  If China, with its newfound faith in capitalism, can embrace and 
attract substantial volumes of FDI why can’t India which is blessed with western 
institutions and capitalist organisations? This impassioned advocacy of increased 
flows of FDI into India is based on the well worn arguments that FDI is a rich source 
of technology and know how and capital to boot, it can invigorate the labour intensive 
export oriented industries of India, promote technological change in the science based 
industries and put India on a growth path on par with China. This exuberance for FDI 
is an article of faith, India is asked to accept it as such, it is not based on an analytical 
review of India's needs and requirements and her potential for attracting large lows of 
FDI. The case for attracting large volumes of FDI into India requires an analysis of 
the determinants and impact of FDI in the Indian context. This is the purpose of this 
paper which is based on the vast literature on FDI in general and FDI in India in 
particular. Section II reviews the determinants of FDI, section III analyses the efficacy 
of FDI in promoting development, Section IV examines policies, and section V 
concludes. 
II Determinants 
Is India capable of attracting much larger volumes of FDI than she does at 
present?  Should India throw all doors wide open to FDI as advocated by the Harvard 
economists? Is China's experience a role model for India? The literature on FDI sheds 
some light on these issues. 
Why do firms go abroad? Why do they choose to invest in specific locations? 
The origins of the theoretical literature on determinants of FDI are to be found in 
Stephen Hymer’s doctoral dissertation (1978).  His thesis briefly put is that firms go 
abroad to exploit the rents inherent in the monopoly over advantages they possess and 
FDI is their preferred mode of operations. The advantages firms possess include 
patented technology, team specific managerial skills, marketing skills and brand 
names. All other methods of exploiting these advantages in external markets such as 
licensing agreements and exports are inferior to FDI because the market for 
knowledge or advantages possessed by firms tends to be imperfect. In other words, 
they do not permit firms to exercise control over operations essential for retaining and  
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fully exploiting the advantages they own. Hymer's insights form the basis for other 
explanations such as the transactions costs and internalisation theories (Buckley and 
Casson, 1991), most of which in essence argue that firms internalise operations, forge 
backward and forward linkages in order to by-pass the market with all its 
imperfections. Dunning (1973) neatly synthesises these and other explanations in the 
well-known eclectic paradigm or the OLI explanation of FDI. For a firm to 
successfully invest abroad it must possess advantages which no other firm possess 
(O), the country it wishes to invest in should offer location advantages (L), and it 
must be capable of internalising operations (I). Internalisation is synonymous with the 
ability of firms to exercise control over operations. And such control is essential for 
the exploitation of the advantages which firms possess and the location advantages 
which host countries offer. 
  It is the location advantages emphasised by Dunning, which forms the core of 
much of the discussion on the determinants of FDI in developing countries. The two 
other attributes necessary for FDI are taken as given from the perspective of 
developing countries. Dunning (1973) set the ball rolling on econometric studies with 
a statistical analysis of survey evidence on the determinants of FDI. His study 
identified three main determinants of FDI in a particular location; market forces 
(including market size and growth, as determined by the national income of the 
recipient country), cost factors (such as labour cost and availability and the domestic 
inflation situation) and the investment climate (as determined by such considerations 
as the extent of foreign indebtedness and the state of the balance of payments).   
Dunning’s (1973, 1981) analysis proved influential and were pursued further by 
others (Agarwal 1980, Root and Ahmed (1979), Levis, 1979, Balasubramanyam and 
Salisu, 1991) Although the empirical literature continues to grow unabated both in 
size and econometric sophistication, its overall message can be briefly summarised in 
the form of the following propositions. 
1  Host countries with sizeable domestic markets, measured by GDP per capita and 
sustained growth of these markets, measured by growth rates of GDP, attract 
relatively large volumes of FDI  
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2  Resource endowments of host countries including natural resources and human 
resources are a factor of importance in the investment decision process of foreign 
firms. 
3  Infrastructure facilities including transportation and communication net works are 
an important determinant of FDI. 
4  Macro economic stability, signified by stable exchange rates and low rates of 
inflation is a significant factor in attracting foreign investors. 
5  Political stability in the host countries is an important factor in the investment 
decision process of foreign firms. 
6  A stable and transparent policy framework towards FDI is attractive to potential 
investors. 
7    Foreign firms place a premium on a distortion free economic and business 
environment. An allied proposition here is that a distortion free foreign trade 
regime, which is neutral in terms of the incentives it provides for import 
substituting (IS) and export industries (EP), attracts relatively large volumes of 
FDI than either an IS or an EP regime. 
8  Fiscal and monetary incentives in the form of tax concessions do play a role in 
attracting FDI, but these are of little significance in the absence of a stable 
economic environment. 
How does India fare on these attributes? She does possess a large domestic 
market, she has achieved growth rates of around 5 to 6 percent per annum in recent 
years, her overall record on macroeconomic stability, save for the crisis years of the 
late eighties, is superior to that of most other developing countries. And judged by he 
criterion of the stability of policies she has displayed a relatively high degree of 
political stability. It is, however, India’s trade and FDI regimes which are seen as 
major impediments to increased inflows of FDI. The product and factor market 
distortions generated by the inward looking import substitution industrial policies 
India pursued until recently have been widely discussed. So too her complex and 
cumbersome FDI regime in place until the nineties. 
Two distinct phases can be identified in India’s foreign trade and investment 
regimes- the pre 1991 reforms phase and the post 1991 phase. The pre 1991 phase, 
which stretches over four decades, was marked by extensive regulation of trade and  
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investment. The cumbersome and complex nature of the regulatory framework during 
these years has been extensively analysed. (Kidron, 1965 Kumar, 1994). The 
specification of sectors in which both foreign financial and technical participation 
were allowed, those in which only technical collaboration was permitted, and those in 
which neither technical or financial participation was allowed reflect the desire to 
restrict foreign ownership and control to sectors of the economy in which its 
contribution was deemed to be essential. Restrictions on ownership of equity by 
foreign firms in cases where projects involved substantial inputs of foreign exchange 
or were export oriented, also reflect the desire to limit foreign control, but at the same 
time take advantage of FDIs foreign exchange earning potential where necessary and 
possible. A preference for technical collaboration agreements as opposed to foreign 
equity ownership also reflects the desire to promote the twin objectives of freedom 
from foreign control and utilisation of foreign technology and know-how. There were 
though bouts of liberalisation, as in the mid fifties and the eighties, mostly though not 
entirely dictated by foreign exchange shortages. The growth in the number of foreign 
collaboration agreements approved over the years (Table 1) and the proportion of 
foreign equity participation in Indian industry reflect these swings in policy. 
India’s reputation for hostility towards foreign economic participation  though is 
mostly due to the restrictions on equity participation and export obligations imposed 
during the 1970s. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1973 was Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi's response to the economic crisis that bedevilled most years of 
her premiership. Her economic policies initiatives were mostly driven by political 
exigencies rather than an objective strategy with specific goals. Hostility to private 
enterprise, especially foreign private enterprise, headline grabbing initiatives such as 
the nationalisation of banks along with increased state control of economic activity 
were all part of an orchestrated strategy to please the electorate. In response to the 
regulation which required foreign firms to dilute their equity holdings to less than 40 
percent many major multinationals such as IBM and Cocoa Cola chose to close down 
their operations in India, some fell in step with the requirement that foreign firms 
should shed equity in favour of Indian nationals, others such as Unilever diversified 
their production base in order to fulfil export obligations stipulated by the FERA in 
return for retaining majority equity ownership. During the period 1967-79 the total 
number of collaboration agreements reached an all time low of 242, and the  
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proportion of agreements with foreign equity participation fell from 36 per cent 
during the years 1959-66 to 16 percent over the years 1967-79 (Kumar 1994). During 
the eleven-year period 1966-79 the total amount of foreign capital approved by the 
government amounted to only $70 million and the net inflow (net of dividends and 
repatriation of capital) was negative (Lall and Mohammad, 1984).  
The mid 1980s saw a considerable though not a radical relaxation of the dirigiste 
trade and investment regime, part of which was a relatively benign attitude towards 
foreign enterprise participation. Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi with his penchant for 
science and technology, mirroring that of his grand father Nehru, appears to have 
been much more sanguine about foreign enterprise participation in the economy than 
his predecessor. The total number of collaboration agreements approved per year 
increased from 242 during the period 1967-79 to 744 during the period 1980-88.  
One of the major consequences of the policy regime during the pre 1991 phase 
was a significant change in the pattern of foreign investment in India, away from 
plantations, minerals and petroleum towards the manufacturing sector. By the end of 
the decade of the eighties manufacturing accounted for nearly 85 per cent out of a 
total stock of FDI around Rs 28 billion. Within the manufacturing sector the high 
technology intensive industries such as machinery and machine tools, transport 
equipment, electrical equipment and chemicals including pharmaceuticals accounted 
for the bulk of foreign capital (Table 2). 
The precise measure of the extent of foreign presence in a specific locale is a 
matter of debate. The proportion of total sales of a sector accounted for by foreign 
firms, their share in total assets, and their share in value added generated by a sector 
are some of the indicators used to measure foreign presence. Although there are a 
number of estimates of foreign presence in Indian industry they differ from each other 
depending on data and concepts they employ. Kumar (1994) estimates that at the end 
of the decade of the eighties foreign share in assets or sales of the organised private 
corporate sector in India was around 23 per cent. The share of foreign firms in 
individual industries within the manufacturing sector though varies widely from a 
high of 98 percent in leather products to a low of 7 per cent in textile machinery. In 
the case of 11 industries, including processed foods, cigarettes, leather goods,  
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pharmaceuticals and automotive components, foreign shares exceeded 66 percent of 
total sales in the individual industries; in 15 others including electrical lamps, electric 
machinery, paints and varnishes and automobile components foreign share in total 
sales ranged between 34 to 66 percent. More recent estimates suggest that over the 
period 1970-94 foreign controlled firms accounted for between a third and a quarter 
of gross sales of India’s manufacturing sector (Athreye and Kapur 2001). 
As both Kumar and Athreye and Kapur comment, the 1973 FERA, referred to 
above, appears to have failed in its objective of limiting foreign control. The required 
dilution of equity in favour of Indian nationals was achieved through fresh equity 
issues and control over operations was retained through wide dispersal of shares 
amongst local shareholders. In any case, these estimates, especially those relating to 
individual industries, suggests that foreign control over Indian industry during the pre 
1991 phase was not low; in fact, it was significant in a number of consumer goods and 
technologically intensive industries. Whist the regulatory phase may have limited the 
absolute volume of foreign capital in India relative to that in some of the Latin 
American and East Asian countries, it may not have limited the extent of control 
exercised by foreign firms in individual industries and the manufacturing sector in 
general. This discussion of FDI in India during the pre 1991 phase suggests that the 
size of markets in India, especially for consumer goods with well known brand 
names, India’s industrialisation policies with emphasis on science and technology 
oriented industries, the generally stable macro economic environment, though 
punctured with episodes of inflation and balance of payments crisis, and her 
endowments of human capital have all been factors in the volume and pattern of FDI 
and technology licensing agreements in the economy during the period 1950-1990. 
And foreign presence in a wide variety of industries appears to have been sizeable 
despite the complex regulations.  
The Post 1991 Phase 
Relaxation of controls over FDI constituted a significant plank of the wide 
ranging economic reforms introduced in 1991 (Table 3) The three main elements of 
the reform were the abolition of the licensing requirements governing domestic 
investment, reduction in tariffs on imports and relaxation of controls over FDI. The  
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principal changes in the foreign investment regime included automatic approval of 
FDI up to 51 percent of equity ownership by foreign firms in a group of 34 
technology intensive industries, a case by case by consideration of applications for 
foreign equity ownership up to 75 percent in nine sectors, mostly relating to 
infrastructure, and the streamlining of procedures relating to approval of investment 
applications in general.   
Relaxation of controls over the extent of foreign ownership of equity signals a 
major departure from the earlier regime, although foreign ownership of equity over 
and above 50 per cent was subject to the requirement that the investors should balance 
all outgoings of foreign exchange on account of their operations with export earnings 
over a seven year period. The reform package as a whole heralded a departure from 
the earlier dirigiste regime. And FDI flows appear to have responded to the new 
initiatives; annual average inflows increased from around $384 million during the late 
eighties to around $ 3 billion during the late nineties. (Table 4). 
Although there are stray voices of dissent echoing the  familiar concerns with 
increased foreign enterprise participation in the economy, the new initiatives have had 
a favourable reception.  Indeed, the often heard lament is that inflows of FDI are low 
relative to the size of the economy, they account for only 5 per cent of gross domestic 
capital formation, actual inflows are much less than approvals (around 21 percent of 
approvals amounting to $54 million between the years 1991-98), and the volume of 
FDI India has attracted shades into insignificance compared with the sizeable volume 
of FDI China has attracted in recent years (Table 5). The official target is set at $10 
billion of FDI inflows per annum, a more than four fold increase from the present 
levels.  
Admittedly inflows of FDI are much lower than that received by not only 
China but also several other East Asian and Latin American countries.  It is often said 
that reported inflows of FDI into China are inflated because a substantial chunk of it 
consists of the so-called round-tripping variety of capital inflows. These are monies 
taken out of China and brought back into the country to take advantage of tax and 
tariff concessions accorded to foreign investors. Round tripping capital flows though  
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are reported to account for only around 6 per cent of total flows, not a huge sum given 
the size of total inflows of FDI into the country.  
It is also argued that China is a large recipient of FDI mostly because of the 
investments from her Diaspora, chiefly from those resident in East Asian countries 
including Hong Kong. This may be so, but there is no reason to dismiss Diaspora 
investments as inferior to those from other sources, a sort of quasi-FDI, as one 
commentator puts it (Wei, S 1999) To the extent that the Diaspora do bring in know 
how and technology, they do make a contribution to the growth process. In fact, 
because of their cultural affinity with those in the Mainland China, the Diaspora may 
be better placed to take advantage of the location advantages the Mainland offers. 
And a substantial proportion of investments from Hong Kong may originate from 
western countries and routed through Hong Kong, a leading financial centre in the 
region. There is also the suggestion that India’s Diaspora, which is sizeable, have 
mostly preferred to invest in bank deposits as opposed to FDI preferred by the 
Chinese Diaspora and hence the low levels of FDI in India.   
The differing composition of the Chinese and Indian Diaspora, in fact, 
provides one reason for the differences in the volume of FDI the two countries have 
attracted. Although there are no precise data on the size and composition of the 
Chinese and Indian Diaspora, available evidence suggests that whilst Indian Diaspora 
are located mostly in the US, the UK and other western countries, Chinese Diaspora 
are mostly located in East Asia. And while the Indian Diaspora, especially so in the 
US, mostly belong to the professions including education, health services and science 
and engineering oriented professions. The Chinese Diaspora are business oriented.  
The opening up of China to trade and investment appears to have provided the 
Chinese Diaspora the opportunity to extend and or shift their business interests to the 
mother country to take advantage of relatively low cost labour and land. The Indian 
Diaspora with their lack of business interests have for long opted for the portfolio 
variety of investments principally bank deposits, the sudden withdrawals of such 
investments was one of the proximate causes for the economic crisis India 
experienced in 1991.  
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The one notable exception here is the participation of India’s Diaspora in the 
Silicon Valley in the spectacular growth of India’s export oriented software industry. 
The Indian software engineers and entrepreneurs in the Silicon Valley appear to have 
successfully exploited the location advantages provided by the Indian industry, mostly 
relatively inexpensive human capital (V. N. Balasubramanyam and A. 
Balasubramanyam, 2001) In contrast China’s exports largely consists of labour-
intensive exports, around 50 to 60 percent of total exports, mostly though not wholly 
on account of Diaspora investments. Both the Indian experience with Software and 
China’s experience with low skilled and semi skilled labour intensive exports endorse 
the proposition that FDI is most effective in the presence of co-operant factors in the 
locale of investment and when it complements local capabilities. 
It is, however, argued that Indian Diaspora or the non-resident Indians (NRIs) 
lack the marketing and labour management skills and hence the relatively low levels 
of NRI investments in India (Guha and Ray, 2000). But then it is also shown that what 
little NRI investments India has attracted are export oriented, mostly labour-intensive 
exports such as garments. The inescapable conclusion must be that Indian Diaspora 
are vastly different in their background and orientation and perhaps in size from the 
Chinese Diaspora. This is one of the reasons for the relatively low volumes of FDI in 
India.  
One other fact which is noteworthy, which follows from the discussion above, 
is that the composition of FDI in  India in general is substantially different from that 
in China. A substantial proportion of FDI in India is located in the high technology 
end of the spectrum of industries and in services, whereas investments in China are 
mostly located in the low technology end of the spectrum including Electronics which 
mostly relates to assembly operations (Table 6). This fact too reflects the differences 
in the stage of industrialisation and local market conditions in the two countries. The 
relatively high volume of FDI in the technologically oriented industries in India 
reflects the attraction of a sheltered domestic market for the products of these 
industries, a consequence of the import-substituting industrialisation strategy the 
country followed for more than four decades.  So too is the sizeable foreign enterprise 
participation in branded consumer goods including food products. Most of the 
consumer goods sector, even after the 1991 reforms, enjoys not only protection from  
  12
import competition, but also access to imports of equipment and protection at 
relatively low rates of tariffs resulting in high rates of effective protection. Foreign 
firms facing a liberalised FDI regime have taken advantage of these high rates of 
protection and a sizeable domestic market for these goods.  The volume of such tariff 
jumping domestic market oriented FDI would be relatively low for a variety of 
reasons. These include the product and factor market distortions typical of an import 
substituting industrialisation strategy, the artificial nature of incentives provided by 
the strategy and the capital and technology intensive nature of such investments. 
(Balasubramanyam, Sapsford and Salisu, 1996) In contrast, export oriented 
investments designed to exploit cheap labour, as in the case of China, tend to be 
sizeable. 
Even so, it can be argued that India too possess large reservoirs of cheap 
labour, and if only she were to put her house in order, she too can attract large 
volumes of export oriented FDI. It is a fact that the economy, even after the wide-
ranging 1991 reforms, continues to be riddled with various sorts of distortions. 
Principal amongst these is the stringent labour regulations in the organised 
manufacturing sector which limit the ability of firms to hire and shed labour in 
response to market conditions. Average levels of tariff continue to be high and the 
administration of the FDI regime continues to be riddled with delays and red tape. 
And, as is often noted, corruption and rent seeking on the part of those in power 
continues to be widespread.   
Admittedly reform of labour laws, elimination of cumbersome bureaucratic 
procedures for the approval of FDI projects and measures to curtail corruption are all 
likely to enhance the attraction of India as a host to foreign firms. These measures 
though would be no less attractive to domestically owned firms.  Large firms in the 
clothing-manufacturing sector, for instance, have responded with alacrity to the recent 
relaxation of the long-standing regulation that the sector should be the preserve of the 
small-scale industries. India is not deficient in the sort of skills required for successful 
exploitation of labour-intensive exports, it is just that she is constrained by the 
crippling regulations and restrictions imposed by the government. Elimination of 
these distortions in the factor and product markets would be in the interests of both 
domestic and foreign firms. It is though arguable if the sort of FDI China has attracted  
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in labour intensive export oriented industries are essential to promote productivity and 
exports in the labour intensive segments of Indian industry. In any case, the rational 
policy would be to provide level playing fields and encourage competition in these 
industries rather than provide various sorts of fiscal incentives and subsidies for 
foreign firms. It is also noteworthy that Indian firms have a notable presence in both 
the domestic and export markets in technologically intensive industries such as 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In this context it is well worth pondering the thesis 
that the relatively large volumes of FDI in China are a consequence of China's policy 
framework, which has failed to provide incentives for domestically owned firms if not 
actively discouraged their growth (Huang, 2002). Foreign firms, with all the 
incentives offered to them, may have taken advantage of the opportunities denied to 
the locally owned Chinese firms. The visible presence of large firms in India in most 
segments of the manufacturing sector, albeit sheltered from competition because of 
the inward looking industrialisation strategy of India, may be a factor in the low 
volumes of FDI India has attracted in the post reform phase.  
None of this is to say that India should rest content with the volume of FDI she 
attracts at present. Admittedly technical know-how relating to design of products and 
marketing skills are required even in the labour intensive export industries such as 
clothing. These sorts of know-how though can be obtained through licensing and 
technical collaboration agreements, both of which have grown in number since the 
1991 reforms. In the past such arrangements, which were preferred to FDI, failed to 
yield the hoped for benefits mostly because of the inability of Indian industry to adapt 
and restructure imported know how. But now India may be better placed to do so, 
with all the experience she has gained over the years and the human capital she has 
accumulated including that in the information technology sector. It is ironic that India 
should have opted for contractual arrangements rather than foreign equity 
participation in the past, when she was ill-equipped to utilise such agreements 
effectively, and now when conditions are ripe for utilising contractual agreements she 
should encourage foreign equity participation.  
In sum, the argument that India should attract large volumes of FDI if only 
because China has done so may be misconceived. The structure, stage of 
development, sources of FDI and historical factors set India apart from China.  The  
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optimum level of FDI a country should harbour is a function of the structure, stage of 
development, sources of FDI it has access to and the volume of co-operant factors it 
possess.  And so too would be the contractual forms of foreign enterprise participation 
the country should opt for. None of these factors underlie the recent exhortations such 
as "in terms of foreign investment, it is the direct investment that should be actively 
sought for and doors should be thrown wide open for foreign direct investment. FDI 
brings huge advantages (new capital, technology, managerial expertise, and access to 
foreign markets) with little or no downside “(Bajpai and Sachs, 2000). The open door 
policies advocated include relaxation of limits on foreign equity participation, 
reduction of corporate tax rates, relaxation of labour laws which at present do not 
allow retrenchment of workers or closure of loss making enterprises, and promotion 
of export processing zones (EPZs). 
As said earlier, some of the reforms such those relating to labour laws, 
elimination of red tape and cumbersome bureaucracy, and financial sector reforms 
should be implemented in the interests of growth and efficiency in general. A 
distortion free economic environment is essential for the growth of both foreign and 
domestic investments. Some of the proposed incentives for FDI, however, may 
generate rather than eliminate distortions. EPZs, advocated by the proponents of FDI, 
is a case in point. They are classic examples of the second best. EPZs are more often 
than not established to offset distortions elsewhere in the economy. Such a partial 
move towards free trade may or may not promote welfare. To the extent they attract 
labour from elsewhere in the economy they may not increase total employment. 
Moreover, the social costs of generating employment on the zones could be 
considerable, and as most of the operations on the zones are confined to the assembly 
of imported components the technology and skills they transmit to the local economy 
would be limited. For these reasons the social costs of establishing EPZs may 
outweigh their benefits (Warr, 1984). Here again China may be a special case. An 
economy with abundant supplies of cheap labour but with little experience of export 
marketing and labour management may be compelled to adopt second best policies. 
Also, Shenzhen the most successful EPZ in China is no more than an outpost of Hong 
Kong with all the marketing expertise and managerial Know-how Hong Kong is able 
to provide. Here again China may not be the role model for India.  
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Increased autonomy over decision-making and implementation of reforms to 
the state governments in India is yet another suggestion for attracting increased 
volumes of FDI. There is some merit in the proposal as it would not only engender 
competition between the states for FDI, but also considerably reduce delays and red 
tape in the approval procedures controlled by the central government. The states of 
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka appear to be much more 
reform oriented than others such as Harayana, Bihar, Kerala and Orissa. They are also 
the states which have attracted relatively large volumes of FDI (Table 7). Here again 
the reforms that are crucial relate to investments in infrastructure, and education. 
States which are able to attract relatively high volumes of FDI and for that matter 
domestic investment are also the ones that score high on these determinants of 
investment. There may though be a downside to granting increased autonomy over 
decision making to the states in a federal set up. It may be used to promote political 
objectives with undesirable consequences for political stability in the country as a 
whole and regional interests may thwart national objectives. The Enron episode in the 
state of Maharashtra may be an apt example in this context.  
There are also repeated references to India's low ranking in the international 
league tables on competitiveness and her high ranking on corruption, both of which 
are cited as deterrents to FDI. India though ranks high amongst the developing 
countries on the so-called FDI outlook index which is based on the current market 
size and its potential for growth. Judged on the basis of these indices India is at once 
seen to be a poor bet for FDI (low rank on competitiveness index) and a good 
prospect (on the basis of the FDI outlook index). The suggestion here is that if only 
India could move up the league tables on competitiveness index she would be able to 
attract large volumes of FDI. These sort of exercises lack analytical content not only 
because they are broad generalisations but also because the so-called competitiveness 
indices are fraught with methodological and statistical problems (See Lall 2001, for a 
comprehensive critique of these indices).  
Even more vacuous are econometric exercises which regress current FDI 
flows into specific countries on variables such as growth rates, per capita incomes and 
corruption indices, and suggest that let alone India not even China has fully exploited 
her potential for inward FDI (Wei, S, 1999). These sorts of exercises are vacuous  
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because they fail to recognise the interdependence between FDI and growth, they 
ignore the composition and quality of FDI countries are able to attract, their stage of 
development, the co-operant factors they are endowed with, and above all they rely on 
dubious estimates of levels of corruption.  
In sum, India has the potential for attracting increased volumes of FDI. She 
can do so with a set of policies which are in the interests of not only foreign investors 
but also domestic investors. It is though a bit far fetched to argue that FDI is a 
panacea for the development problem and India should throw all doors wide open to 
FDI. It would also be a folly to woo FDI if only because China attracts relatively high 
volumes of FDI. 
III Efficacy 
Few would dispute that FDI is an effective mechanism for the transfer of 
technology and know-how to developing countries. The one principal characteristic of 
FDI which distinguishes it from other sorts of capital flows, however, is its ability to 
transmit technology and know-how, broadly defined to include managerial and 
marketing know-how. Indeed, theoretical explanations of the birth and growth of 
MNEs, the principal purveyors of FDI, are cast in terms of the monopoly over 
advantages, broadly defined as technology and know-how, they possess and their 
desire to exploit the rents inherent in these advantages in overseas markets. And they 
prefer FDI to other methods of market participation such as exports and licensing 
because of market imperfections which may erode the monopoly over advantages 
they possess (Hymer 1976, Buckley and Casson, 1976, Dunning, 1988, 1993). MNEs 
overcome such imperfections by internalising operations from production to sales i.e. 
by forging backward and forward linkages.  They effectively by pass the market as it 
were and confine their operations to the internal bureaucracy of the firm. If the 
objective of firms undertaking FDI is to preserve and protect the advantages they 
possess how can such investments benefit the host economies?  They do so because of 
the externalities or spillovers, as it is now known, from their investments which 
accrue to the host economies. Apart from the employment FDI creates, and the 
exports and foreign exchange earnings it generates, it is the technology spillovers 
which are regarded as the major contribution of FDI to development.   
  17
Foreign firms are unlikely to voluntarily surrender the advantages they possess 
to local firms in the economy, nor can they be compelled to do so, although attempts 
to force them to do so are often made with the imposition of various regulations such 
as local content requirements and injunctions to employ nationals of the host countries 
in managerial positions, known as trade related investment measures (TRIMS).  
There are, however, channels through which such spillovers occur. These 
include imitation, acquisition of skills, competition and enhanced export intensity of 
locally owned firms (Gorg and Greenaway 2001). Imitation of the products produced 
by the foreign firms through reverse engineering, an activity which enables local 
firms to copy the process and design of new products, is a recognised channel for 
spillovers. That such spillovers do occur is evidenced by the demand for intellectual 
property protection voiced by foreign firms.  Such imitation need not be replication, it 
rarely is, but it does allow locally owned firms to benefit from the technology and 
know-how perfected by foreign firms. It is noteworthy that for such imitation to be 
successful the locally owned firms must possess the human and engineering skills 
required for reverse engineering. 
Acquisition of skills occurs mainly through the movement of skilled labour 
employed by the foreign firms to locally owned firms. Quite often foreign firms may 
have invested in training the relatively cheap labour available in the host countries. 
Such internal migration of labour is a significant channel for spillovers. Labour 
employed in the foreign firms may wish to set up their own establishments with the 
experience and skills gained from their sojourn in the foreign firms. Also, foreign 
firms may, either in response to TRIMS imposed by the host country or because of 
distinct cost advantages, train or establish local suppliers of components and parts.  
This too would be a channel for spillovers.  
Another potent channel for spillovers is competition. The theory here is that 
the entry of foreign firms increases competition in the market place and locally owned 
firms are compelled to increase their productive efficiency. This is the sort of 
efficiency recognised in the literature as X-efficiency rather than allocative efficiency. 
Increased competition from locally owed firms also induces foreign firms to invest in 
R and D either in the host country or in their home countries in order to be ahead of  
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the locally owned firms. Increased competition may also result in spillovers through 
the other channels referred to above. Interesting in this context is the observation by 
Richard Caves (1971) that competition from foreign owned firms is much more 
invigorating than competition from domestically owned firms. This may be because 
competition from technologically endowed foreign owned firms is much more intense 
than that from locally owned firms. Finally, locally owned firms may learn marketing 
techniques and methods of penetrating export markets from export oriented foreign 
firms.      
These propositions have been extensively tested in the context of FDI in 
developed and developing countries (For a survey of the empirical literature see Gorg 
and Greenaway, 2000, Blomstrom and Kokko 2000,). These econometric studies have 
produced a mixed bag of results, some identify positive spillovers from the presence 
of foreign owned firms in the manufacturing sectors, others find them to be either 
negligible or negative (Table 8). Prominent amongst the studies which have identified 
positive spillovers is that relating to Mexico, (Blomstrom and Wolff, 1994), where the 
presence of foreign owned firms helped Mexican firms to converge to US 
productivity levels during 1965-82. Significant amongst those which find little or 
negative spillovers is the study on Morocco listed in Table-.8.  It is suggested that 
studies which find positive spillovers may be suspect because they rely on cross 
section data at the industry level, which does not allow for productivity growth over 
time and the positive effects they pick up may be due to MNEs gravitating towards 
high productivity sectors. In other words, foreign firms may not be the cause of 
productivity efficiency; they may choose to invest in relatively productive sectors and 
industries in the host countries. Yet another survey paper, besides echoing the concern 
that studies using cross section data as opposed to panel data are more likely to 
identify positive spillovers, suggests that publication bias may have yielded a 
relatively large number of studies identifying positive spillovers. (Gorg and Strobl, 
2000). The suggestion here is that academic journals lean towards publishing papers 
which report statistically significant results. In sum, econometric studies do not permit 
broad generalisations such as FDI brings huge benefits, there is no downside to FDI 
and that large volumes of FDI are always beneficial.   
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Ever since the 1991 reforms and the relatively mild bout of reforms in the 
mid-eighties, a number of studies on the impact of reforms on FDI and its efficacy in 
India's manufacturing sector have appeared. A study on the mid-eighties liberalisation 
efforts finds that both domestically owned and foreign owned firms in the chemicals 
and machinery industries increased their investments, imports of capital goods, in 
house Rand D expenditures and imports of technology. There was, however, no such 
growth of investments by foreign firms in the pharmaceuticals industry mostly 
because of the absence of protection of intellectual property legislation in India at that 
time (Siddharthan and Pandit 1998). A variant of this finding is that over the period 
1980-1994, which includes both the liberalisation episodes, there were technology 
spillovers in the pharmaceutical industry of India, but only between multinational 
firms themselves with little impact on domestic firms (Feinberg and Majumdar 2001). 
Here again weak protection of intellectual property is seen as the reason for the 
spillovers which were confined to MNEs themselves in the pharmaceuticals sector. 
There are also studies which identify positive spillovers. A study based on 
stochastic frontier analysis, utilising data for 368 medium and large sized firms in 
India’s manufacturing sector, finds that there were positive spillovers from FDI in 
science based industries, but only in the case of domestic firms which possessed 
significant Rand D capabilities. In the sub- group of ‘non-science’ industries presence 
of foreign owned firms had compelled domestic firms to increase their productive 
efficiency (Kathuria , 2001).  In addition to these econometric studies, there are also 
case studies of linkages and technology  transfer between foreign owned and locally 
owned firms relating to specific MNEs in India and specific industries such as India’s 
truck manufacturers (Lall, 1980, 1983). These studies, shorn of the statistical and 
methodological problems  which beset the econometric studies, are able to identify 
the precise nature and extent of linkages and spillovers. And they do identify 
spillovers and more specifically  linkages  which are undertaken by MNEs with a 
view to promoting productive efficiency and minimising costs.  
A number of studies have investigated the export performance of foreign 
owned firms in India for various periods of time (Lall and Mohammad 1984, Lall and 
Kumar 1981, Kumar 1994, Aggarwal, 2000). In general the export performance of the 
foreign owned firms is found to be no better than that of locally owned firms.  Both  
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groups appear to have targeted the sheltered profitable domestic markets rather than 
the highly competitive export markets during the pre-1991 phase. Aggarwal’s study, 
based on data relating to 1315 firms in the Indian manufacturing sector, for the period 
1992-93 to 1994-95 though concludes that the export performance of foreign owned 
firms was distinctly superior to that of locally owned firms, especially so in the high-
tech  industries. The 1991 reforms appear to have had an impact on the export 
performance of both foreign owned and locally owned firms, with the former 
exhibiting a superior performance.  
Another recent study (Mahambare 2001) based on a sample of 2417 firms in 
the manufacturing sectors for the period 1988-89 to 1997-98 notes that foreign firms 
in chemicals, drugs and non-electrical machinery sectors increased their exports in the 
post-reform period. There is also evidence to show that the reforms have had a 
favourable impact on the productivity of foreign firms. Mahambare also notes an 
improvement in the efficiency of foreign firms in the post-reform period. The analysis 
which is based on Data Development technique, reports that 61% of foreign firms 
showed an improvement in efficiency after the reforms compared to 35% of locally 
owned firms. Changes in the pattern of financing, namely a decline in the debt-equity 
ratio in the post reform period also appears to exert a positive impact on efficiency of 
foreign owned firms in chemicals, inorganic chemicals, drugs, computer hardware, 
and software industries.  
As stated earlier, the statistical studies on spillovers yield a mixed bag of 
results. But they do identify a number of factors which are likely to promote 
spillovers of technology and know-how from foreign owned firms to the locally 
owned firms. First, the magnitude of spillovers tends to be high in industry segments 
where the gap in technological capabilities between foreign owned and locally owned 
firms tends to be narrow. Second, spillovers are likely to be high when the 
competition in the market place between locally owned and foreign firms tends to be 
intense. Third, the extent and magnitude of spillovers differ between industries and 
host countries. Fourth, several studies show that spillovers are proportional to the 
magnitude of foreign presence, measured by shares of foreign firms in total equity or 
sales of the relevant industry groups. Note though that this finding is challenged by 
Kokko (1996) who argues that it is competition between foreign and locally owned  
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firms and not the volume of FDI which influences spillovers.  Fifth, local capabilities 
including R and D and human skills sustain high levels of spillovers.  Finally, 
analogous to the last proposition, is the suggestion that liberalisation of foreign trade, 
increased competition and development of local infrastructure all promote spillovers. 
These propositions are also endorsed by the endogenous growth theory or the 
new growth theory (Romer 1986, 1987, Lucas 1988). Although there are several 
variants of the theory, its main message is that technical change is endogenous. In a 
world of imperfect competition firms would have an incentive to invest in research 
and development. They compete with each other on the basis of new cost reducing 
methods of production and innovations designed to produce new products. Those in 
the lead would capture the market and retain their market share until imitators of their 
products and processes appear. But such competition would spur further research and 
development.   
Endogenous growth theory explicitly recognises the role of spillovers in 
promoting technical change and growth, styled as externalities in the growth 
literature. Technology and know how are in the nature of non-rivalrous inputs, in the 
sense that the use of it by one entity does not preclude others from using it. Put 
differently the marginal cost of replicating knowledge may be zero. It is worth noting 
that whilst increased investments in capital of any kind, including human capital, may 
result in diminishing returns at the level of an individual firm, it may nonetheless 
increase productivity of capital at the aggregate level of say the industry.  This could 
be the case if spillovers and externalities are present.   
The message of all this is clear. Externalities or spillovers a re significant 
sources of growth and technical change, and FDI is a major engine of such spillovers. 
Increased volumes of FDI alone, however, are unlikely to generate widespread 
spillovers. In the absence of competition and co-operant factors such as local R and D 
and human skills spillovers from FDI may be limited. To put it another way FDI is a 
catalyst of technical change and growth, it cannot be expected to be the prime mover. 
Indeed empirical research suggests that FDI is most effective as an agent of change in 
economies which possess a threshold level of human capital and skills and in those 
economies which have attained a threshold level of growth (Balasubramanyam, Salisu  
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and Sapsford 1999, Blomstrom, Lipsey and Sajan, 1996). In sum, in the absence of 
the necessary ingredients and co-operant factors large volumes of FDI alone may be 
ineffective in promoting growth and may even be counter productive.  For these 
reasons the exuberance relating to the role of FDI in the growth process and 
exhortations that India should adopt a wide open doors policy towards FDI may be ill 
conceived. 
III Policy Framework 
The 1991 reforms have considerably relaxed the FDI regime. The issue though 
is whether India should embark on further liberalisation and adopt a wide open doors 
policy which would include further relaxation of limits on foreign equity 
participation, autonomy to state governments over policies towards FDI, promotion of  
export processing zones and presumably fiscal incentives of various sorts to foreign 
firms. The foregoing discussion of the determinants and efficacy of FDI suggests that 
this enthusiasm for FDI should be tempered by recognition of the factors which 
govern FDI flows and its efficacy. Large volumes of FDI alone are unlikely to 
promote the objectives of development. It is noteworthy that although most studies on 
China do find that FDI has contributed to exports and growth, they do not find the 
relationship  between FDI and productive efficiency to be all that robust (Wei, Y and 
Liu, X, 2001). This conclusion relates to the experience of China’s electronics 
industry and the weak impact of foreign presence on the productive efficiency of the 
industry in general is attributed to negative spillovers; competition from foreign firms 
appears to have reduced the ability of locally owned firms to compete effectively in 
the market place.  More often than not specific polices favouring  FDI may yield 
relatively high private rates of returns to foreign firms but may contribute little to the 
social rates of return expected from the operations of foreign firms. Such policies may 
result in the establishment of FDI enclaves with very little linkages to the rest of the 
economy. Export processing zones, discussed earlier, are a case in point.   
The evidence from statistical studies and theoretical literature strongly endorse 
the proposition that policies geared to removing factor and product market distortions 
in general are conducive to both increased flows of FDI and its efficacy in promoting 
development objectives. Such policies include liberalisation of the foreign trade  
  23
regime, investments in infrastructure facilities, dismantling of arcane labour laws 
which have done little to promote the growth of employment or the welfare of labour, 
the promotion of local R and D and investments in the growth of human capital. The 
essential message here is that level playing fields which do not discriminate between 
locally owned and foreign owned firms are much more likely to be efficacious than 
specific policies geared to FDI. Arguably India may be at a stage of development and 
industrial sophistication which would enable her to effectively utilise licensing and 
technical collaboration agreements, especially so in the labour-intensive export 
oriented industries. Again liberalisation of the foreign trade regime may engender 
increased competition from international sources and promote exports. There are 
though two caveats in order here. First, liberalisation of the foreign trade regime does 
not imply an all out export promotion strategy with attendant export subsidies and 
various other incentives for exports. As suggested by Bhagwati (1978) a distortion 
free regime is a neutral regime which does not favour either the export oriented 
industries or the import substitution industries, but allows comparative advantage to 
determine the allocation of investments between the two groups. There is some 
statistical evidence in support of the proposition that such a neutral regime is likely to 
attract both relatively large volumes of FDI and promote its efficacy 
(Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford, 1996). Here again the emphasis of policy 
should be on promoting a distortion free market environment for one and all and not 
just foreign firms.  
It is also received wisdom by now that various sorts of incentives geared to 
attract FDI may do little in the absence of macro economic stability, possession of co-
operant factors such as labour skills and stability of policies. Competition between 
developing countries for FDI based on such incentive packages may only succeed in 
yielding rents to the foreign firms and diverting incomes from the host countries to the 
foreign firms. National policy regimes designed to delimit the monopoly power of 
foreign firms, specifically those governing acquisitions of locally owned firms by 
foreign owned firms, may also be futile. Here gain the problem is lack of policy 
coordination between developing countries which foreign firms may adroitly take 
advantage to thwart domestic objectives. For these reasons there may be a case for an 
international compact on FDI, similar to the one on trade in services, under the aegis 
of the WTO. This suggestion has been often mooted in the Ministerial meetings of the  
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WTO. India though has steadfastly opposed such a compact. Although a detailed case 
for an international compact on FDI is the subject for a separate paper, it is worth 
pondering whether such a compact, which would place development objectives of 
host countries at the fore, would be a much more sagacious policy move than 
divergent unilateral policies of individual developing countries.  
Other policy suggestions such as the promotion of transparency in the laws 
and regulations governing FDI, elimination of cumbersome bureaucracy and red tape 
and associated corruption are incontestable.  There is now a sizeable body of literature 
on the causes and consequences of corruption both in India and other developing 
countries. One message here again is that increased government interference in the 
market place is one of the key reasons for the widespread corruption in countries such 
as India and China.  
III Conclusions 
FDI is a superb conduit for the transfer of technology and know-how to 
developing countries. This message has not been lost on India's policy makers. They 
have though until the decade of the nineties attempted to regulate and control its 
spheres of activity and the contractual forms of foreign enterprise participation in the 
economy. The framework of policies they put in place was guided by the desire to 
limit foreign control of economic activity but at the same time take advantage of the 
technology and know how provided by foreign capital. This attempt at riding two 
horses in tandem, a complex feat, inevitably resulted in a complex and cumbersome 
bureaucratically guided FDI regime and earned India the reputation for hostility 
towards FDI. Nonetheless, the volume of FDI in segments of the manufacturing sector 
was significant if not substantial. The 1991 economic reforms, a watershed in India's 
economic development strategy, signalled a major departure in the FDI policy 
framework and removed many of the restraints on ownership and composition of FDI.  
It is a fact that the 1991 reforms were a response to the grave economic crisis which 
the country was faced with in 1991, most liberalisation attempts in recent history have 
been driven by crises of one sort or the other.  And far from representing a genuine 
change in heart towards foreign enterprise participation, India may have been 
compelled to adopt a liberal FDI regime. Nevertheless inflows of FDI increased  
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appreciably during the nineties and FDI appears to have had an impact on growth, 
exports and productive efficiency of Indian industry.   
Even so, there are those who argue that a lot more needs to be done and India 
should throw all doors wide open to FDI. The spectacular growth of FDI in China is 
frequently invoked in support of this passionate advocacy of FDI. This paper has 
argued that this exuberance for FDI should be tempered by the recognition that FDI is 
a superb catalyst of growth and not an initiator, its efficacy in promoting development 
objectives is conditioned by the presence of co-operant factors in the host economies 
and it is most effective in countries which possess a threshold level of human capital. 
There is no reason to believe that inflows of large volumes of FDI alone necessarily 
promote the growth of the social product. The optimum level of FDI a country should 
aspire for is conditioned by the history and the stage of its industrialisation, the 
sources of FDI it has ease of access to and its endowments of co-operant factors and 
the sort of institutions it possesses t  facilitate and monitor the operations of foreign 
firms. For these reasons the thesis that India should regard China as a role model may 
be misconceived. The paper has no quarrel with the advocacy of policies designed to 
remove various sorts of distortions in product and factor markets, reform of labour 
laws and promotion of infrastructure and the growth of human capital. These are 
policies which should be adopted in the interests of both domestic and foreign 
investment. Indeed, a level playing field for one and all may be a much better bet than 
specific policies geared to the promotion of FDI. The paper also suggests that India 
may now be better placed than in the past to effectively utilise licensing and technical 
collaboration agreements as opposed to FDI. Finally, there may be a good case for a 
multilateral compact on FDI under the aegis of the WTO, a suggestion which India 
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Table 1: Foreign Collaboration Approvals, 1948-1993 
 
    Those with foreign equity 
Period  Average number 
of collaborations 








year (Rs million) 
1948-58  50  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
1959-66  297  108*  36.4  n.a.
1967-79  242  39  16.1  53.62
1980-88  744  170  22.8  930.84
1989-90  635  194  30.6  2,224.95
1991-93  1,315  589  44.8  44,280.40
Note: n.a. – not available, * based on the basis of 1961-66 
Source: Kumar (1994) 
Table 2 Sectoral Distribution of the Stock of FDI in India (Rs billions) 
  Mar-64 Mar-74  Mar-80  Mar-90 
  Value % Value %  Value  % Value % 
I. Plantations  1.1  18.7  1.1  11.7  0.4  4.1  2.6  9.5 
II. Mining  0.05  0.9  0.1  0.8  0.1  0.8  0.1  0.3 
III. Petroleum  1.4  25.3  1.4  14.7  0.4  3.9  0.0  0.1 
IV. Manufacturing  2.3  40.5  6.3  68.4  8.1  86.9  23.0  84.9 
Food and beverages  0.3 13.2 0.5  8.3 0.4 4.8  1.6  7.0 
Textiles  0.2 7.2 0.4 5.7  0.3  3.9 0.9 4.0 
Machinery and Machine Tools  0.2 6.8 0.4 6.7  0.7  8.8 3.5  15.4 
Transport and transport Equipment  0.2 6.5 0.3 5.1  0.5  6.3 2.8  12.3 
Metal and Metal Products  0.3 14.4 0.9 13.9  1.2  14.6 1.4  6.1 
Electrical goods  0.2 7..9 0.7 10.9  1.0  12.0 3.0 12.8 
Chemicals and Allied Products  0.6 26.2 2.0 32.6  3.0  37.2 7.7 33.4 
Miscellaneous  0.4 17.6 1.1 16.7  1.0  12.3 2.0  8.8 
V. Services  0.8  14.6  0.4  4.4  0.4  4.1  1.4  5.2 
Total   5.7  100  9  100  9  100  27  100 










Table 3: Major Economic Reforms in India 
Prior to 1991  Reforms 
Industrial licensing, reserved several 
Industries for the public sector 
 
Abolished with a few exceptions. 
MRTP act restricting corporate investment  Relaxed. 
Imports subject to quotas and tariffs  Removal of quotas  and substantial lowering of tar
Restrictions on FDI, foreign equity 
Discouraged 
Many sectors opened up to FDI, automatic 
approval of foreign equity up to 51% in 
many sectors. 
 
Control over foreign exchange 
 
Largely liberalised current account, although 
restrictions on capital account remain. 
 
Ban on foreign portfolio investment  Relaxed rules. 
Severe restrictions on the timing and pricing
of capital issues 
 
Substantial capital market reforms. 
Interest rate ceilings, subsidised lending  Ceilings largely removed, subsidised lending 
reduced. 
 
Access to foreign technology restricted  Policies relating to technology relaxed. 
 
 
Table 4: Number of Foreign Collaborations Approvals in India 
(August 1991 to May 2002) 
  Technical Financial 
1991-1995 3954  4183 
1996 744  1559 
1997 660  1665 
1998 595  1191 
1999 498  1726 
2000 418  1726 
2001 288  1982 
2002 118  940 
Total 7275  14972 






Table 5: Realised FDI (US $ billion) 
  China India 
1979-1990 20.6  1.5 
1991 4.4  0.1 
1992 11.0  0.1 
1993 27.5  0.3 
1994 33.8  0.6 
1995 73.3  1.3 
1996 41.7  2.1 
1997 45.3  2.8 
1998 45.5  3.6 
1999 40.4  2.5 
2000 40.8  2.2 
2001 46.9  2.3 
2002(P)    3.9 
Note: Financial year for India is from April-March 
Source: China - PRC Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
India - 1979-90 World Bank database, 1991 onwards Economic Survey 01/02. 
 
Table 6: Composition of FDI in Manufacturing in India and China 
 China  India 
 1995  Aug.1991-Sep.97 
Low Technology Intensive Industries   
Food and beverages  10.5 15.1 
Textiles 8.9 4.0 
Garments and footwear  6.0 na 
Paper and Paper Products, Printing  4.7 3.6 
Leather and related products  3.6 na 
Total 33.7 22.7 
 
High Technology Intensive Industries  
Chemical and chemical products *  3.4 18.5 
Rubber Products  1.8 0.9 
Plastic Products  5.1 na 
Non Metal Mineral Products  7.7 na 
Metal and Metal Products  5.5 12.7 
Machinery Manufacturing  4.0 18.0 
Special purpose equipment  1.9 na 
Transport Equipment  5.9 15.4 
Electrical equipment and Machinery  6.6 8.1 
Electronics and Communication  9.6 na 
Instruments 1.8 na 
Other Manufacturing  3.6 
Total 47.3 77.3 
        Note: * including pharmaceuticals 





Table 7: State-wise Break-up of Foreign Collaborations  
(Period - August1991 to May 2002) 
STATE  Number of Approvals  % of Total 
 Total Technical  Financial 
  21926 7039 14887 2804.4 (Rs billion) 
MAHARASHTRA 3959 1146 2813 17.4 
DELHI 1951 214 1737 12.0 
TAMIL NADU  2152 542 1610 8.3 
KARNATAKA 1950 448 1502 7.7 
GUJARAT 1049 505 544 6.6 
ANDHRA PRADESH  1010 239 771 4.7 
MADHYA PRADESH  225 70 155 3.3 
WEST BENGAL  591 191 400 3.1 
ORISSA 136 49 87 2.9 
UTTAR PRADESH  737 261 476 1.7 
HARYANA 779 288 491 1.3 
RAJASTHAN 320 100 220 1.1 
PUNJAB 183 56 127 0.7 
KERALA 264 62 202 0.5 
PONDICHERRY 114 39 75 0.4 
HIMACHAL PRADESH  97 57 40 0.4 
GOA 176 59 117 0.3 
BIHAR 47 22 25 0.3 
CHATTISGARH 45 29 16 0.2 
CHANDIGARH 51 10 41 0.1 
JHARKHAND 73 49 24 0.1 
Others state and locations 
not known) 
6017 2603 3414 26.8 
 Source: Secretariat for Industrial Assistance, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India (2002)  
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                                Table-8 Studies on Spillovers. 
















2 Blomstrom  (1986)  Mexico  1970/1975 cs  Industry  + 
3 Blomstrom  &  Wolff 
(1994) 
Mexico 1970/1975  cs  Industry  + 
4 Kokko  (1994)  Mexico  1970  cs  Industry  + 
5 Kokko  (1996)  Mexico  1970  cs  Industry  + 
6  Haddad & Harrison 
(1993) 
Morocco  1985-1989  panel  Firm & ind.  ? 
7  Kokko et al. (1996)  Uruguay  1990  Cs  Firm  ? 
8 Blomstrom  & 
Sjoholm (1999) 
Indonesia 1991  Cs  Firm  + 
9 Sjoholm  (1999a)  Indonesia 1980-1991 Cs  Firm  + 
10 Sjoholm  (1999b)  Indonesia  1980-1991  Cs  Firm  + 
11  Chuang & Lin 
(1999) 
Tiawan 1991  Cs  Firm  + 
12  Aitken & Harrison 
(1999) 
Venezuela 1976-1989 Panel Firm  - 
13 Kathuria  (2000)  India  1976-1989  Panel  Firm  ? 
14  Kokko et al (2001)  Uruguay  1988  Cs  Firm  ? 
15 Kugler  (2001)  Colombia  1974-1998  Panel  Industry  ? 
Source Gorg H and Greenaway D, Foeign Direct Investment and Intra-Industry 
Spillovers; A review of the Literature, Leverhulme Centre For Research on 
Globalisation and Economic Policy, Nottttingham University 
 